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NOTES AND COMMENTS

may order the selection of an alternate juror to sit with the other
twelve and serve as a juror in case one of the original twelve should
die or be discharged has been held not to infringe upon the constitu22
tional provisions
JOEL DENTON.

Federal Crimes-Interpretation of Statute for Protection of National
Banks-Incorporation of State Definition of Felony into
Federal Criminal Statute
Petitioner was indicted and convicted under the National Banking
Law for entering a national bank in Nebraska with the intent to cash
a no fund check for $42.50, which he in fact succeeded in cashing. The
statute under which the indictment was drawn reads:
".. . or whosoever shall enter or attempt to enter any bank, or building used in whole or in part as a bank, with intent to commit in such
bank or building or part thereof, so used, any felony or larceny, shall
be... [fined or imprisoned]."'
The cashing of a bad check is not of itself an offense against the United
States, but it is a felony under the laws of Nebraska. 2 Petitioner
brought habeas corpus proceedings against the warden of the Federal
Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, on the ground that he had committed no offense against the United States. The United States District Court of Kansas granted habeas corpus. The Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the decision, holding that by using the
words "any felony" Congress indicated an intent to include in the
statute all felonies, under either federal or state law, having relation
to the preservation of the efficiency of a national bank.3
The general rule is that penal statutes are to be construed strictly,
but this rule is relaxed to the extent that they are not to be construed
so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.4 Congress
had the power to adopt state felonies by this statute if it wished to do
so, 5 but there seems to be no precedent for such adoption by the court
under the guise of interpreting Congressional intent.
2

State v. Dalton, 206 N. C. 507, 174 S. E. 422 (1934).

150 STAT. 749 (1937), 12 U.. S. C. A. §588b (a) (Supp. 1942). This statute
was passed in 1937 to amend the bank robbery statute so as to include burglary
and larceny, or entry with intent to commit any felony or larceny.
' ComP. STAT. NEBR. (1929) Ch. 28, §1212; Ch. 29, §102.
'-Hudspeth v. Melville, 127 F. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) (one judge
dissenting). Same holding on the basis of this case in Hudspeth v. Tornello, 128
F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942) (same judge dissenting); United States v.
Jerome, 130 F. (2d) 514 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1942) (one judge dissenting), cert.
granted, Jerome v. United States, 11 U. S. L. WEEK 3106 (U. S.1942).
' United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 76, 5 L. ed. 37 (1820);
MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (6th ed. 1920) 484.
' Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S.256, 47 S.Ct. 629, 71 L. ed. 1036 (1927)
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The United States courts do not recognize common-law offenses,
the criminal jurisdiction of the courts being derived expressly from acts
of Congress ;6 nor can the federal courts take cognizance of state statutes in criminal proceedings to make an act an offense which is not
made so by Congress. 7 Neither can statutes creating and defining
crimes be extended by intendment, and no act, however wrongful, can
be punished unless dearly within the terms of the statute.8 These
familiar doctrines seem to lead to the conclusion that the courts are
bound to consider only offenses defined by Acts of Congress, and cannot look to state statutes for definitions unless they are so authorized
by an unmistakable Congressional intent.
In other intances where Congress has intended to incorporate state
laws into the federal law there has been an express announcement of
that intent. An example of this is the specific adoption of the state
penal offenses as offenses against the federal government when they
are committed on government-owned property.0 This statute was upheld by the Supreme Court ;10 however, this would not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that such adoption was intended in the present statute,
unless the word "any" is
for it contains no expression of that intent
11
construed as indicating such a purpose. *
It would seem that "felony" as used in a federal statute must logically be interpreted to mean a felony under the Federal Criminal Code
as Congress has -defined it.1 2 It is generally held that a statutory
definition of a word must prevail regardless of what other meaning
may be attributable thereto.1 The fact that the statute in question is
(holding that Congress may protect state banks which are members of the Federal
Reserve System by making acts committed within them criminal); Franklin v.
United States, 216 U. S. 559, 30 S. Ct. 434, 54 L. ed. 615 (1910) (holding that
Congress may incorporate state offenses as offenses against the federal government where it has jurisdiction).

7 Cranch (U. S.) 32, 3 L. ed. 259 (1812) ; CLARK
(2d ed. 1927) §12(b), p. 21.
United States v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. 198 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1880).
'Todd v. United States, 158 U. S. 278, 15 S. Ct. 889, 39 L. ed. 982 (1895).
935 STAT. 1145 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §468 (1927).
20 Franklin v. United States, 216 U. S. 559, 30 S. Ct. 434, 54 L. ed. 615 (1910).
1*When the statute was first drawn by the Attorney General it read "any
larceny or other depredation," but the House Judiciary Committee amended it to
read "any felony or larceny," H. R. REP. No. 732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937),
and the basis for the holding in the instant case was this substitution. It could
easily be argued that "felony" was substituted for "other depredation" merely
to make the statute clearer, and that "any" was left in because it was there when
the statute was first written to show that the statute included all larcenies.
1235 STAT. 1152 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §541 (1927).
18
Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333, 79 L. ed. 780
(1934); see Emery Byrd Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 98 F. (2d) 166,
170 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938). These cases involve civil suits, but their use of a word
in a statute would be analogous to the use of a word in a criminal statute when
that word is defined by statute.
6 United States v. Hudson,
& MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES
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under the banking code rather than the criminal code would not seem
to make any difference, for it is a penal offense, even though jurisdiction over it is had under the power of the government to regulate
national banks and currency. It would hardly seem, in the light of this
reasoning, that "felony" as used in the statute is ambiguous, but even
if it were considered to be so, ambiguities are not to be solved so as to
embrace offenses not clearly within the law,14 and judicial enlargement
of a criminal statute by interpretation is at war with a fundamental
concept of common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate
definiteness. 15
Along with that portion of the statute considered in this case, Congress made the additional provision that when there was an actual taking or carrying away, with intent to steal or purloin any money or
property belonging to or in the custody of the bank, it should be punished as therein specified, the punishment being such as to make the
crime a felony when the amount was over $50, and a misdemeanor
when it was $50 or less. 16 This could lead to the conclusion that
Congress meant to make the same distinction when there is an entering
with "intent to commit any felony or larceny." There would seem to
be no logical basis for arguing that the entering with intent to obtain
$42.50 by cashing a -bad check should be a more serious offense than
actually stealing $42.50; and had the indictment been for the latter,
under the statute itself, petitioner could only have received a sentence
of one year and a fine of $1,000 or both. However, it was possible,
under the interpretation incorporating the state law to give him a sentence of twenty years, and a fine of $5,000. Under this construction
the statute provides a greater penalty for entering with intent to commit the crime than it -does if the crime is actually committed. Thus it
would be better for purposes of punishment to indict him for an entry
with intent, for which he could be given up to twenty years and a fine
of $5,000, than for an actual commission of the larceny, for which he
could only get ten years and a fine of $5,000. It would seem that there
would be no need for the distinction between grand and petit larceny
unless it was also intended to limit the entering With intent to commit
any felony correspondingly. This observation may be strengthened by
"IKrichman v. United States, 256 U. S. 363, 41 S. Ct. 514, 65 L. ed. 992
(1921) (holding that a porter was not to be considered an officer of the United
States when the government was operating the railroads).
" Pierce v. United States, 314 U. S. 306, 62 S. Ct. 237, 86 L. ed. 238 (1941)
(holding that the interpretation of a statute making it a crime to impersonate a
federal officer did not extend to an officer under the T. V. A.).
1050 STAT. 749 (1937), 12 U. S. C. A. §588b(a) (Supp. 1942). When the
robbery statute was amended in 1937 entering with intent to commit any felony
or larceny was made the same grade offense as robbery itself as far as the penalties are concerned, but a distinction was made when there was a completed
larceny, between grand and petit.
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the fact that when the bill was first on the floor of Congress it did not
differentiate between a felony and a misdemeanor, 17 but later it was
suggested in debate that such a distinction was necessary so that all
grades of completed larceny would not be penalized in the same manner,' 8 and an amendment was added providing for this division.' 0 In
a case decided in the same circuit as the instant case the statute was
interpreted as creating four separate and distinct offenses, in that the
force and violence required in the first part of the statute to create
robbery was not essential to the offenses of entering with intent to
20
commit any felony or larceny or the actual completion of the larceny.
This could be interpreted as a holding that Congress did not intend
for the division of larceny in the completed offense to limit in any way
the clause relating to entering with intent to commit any felony or
larceny.
An analogous situation to the instant case might arise under a provision of the espionage act authorizing the issuance of a search warrant
where the property to be seized was used as a means of committing "a
felony."'2 ' In interpreting the act the court held that "felony" covers
any felony arising under any federal statutes. 22" The present question
might well arise, however, where the goods seized were used in the
commission of an offense against the state, but not against the federal
government.
Passing on from the logic of the construction of the statute it might
be well to look at some of the practical effects of such a construction.
This interpretation of the statute can make an act committed in one
state an offense against the federal government, whereas if it were committed in another state it would be no offense against the federal government. For instance, if petitioner had presented his check in North
Carolina he could not have been indicted under the statute, for the
North Carolina law makes cashing a bad check only a misdemeanor ;23
but had he written it in West Virginia he would be guilty of a felony
under the West Virginia Code 24" and thus would be guilty of an offense
against the United States.
17

H. R. REP. No. 732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
1981 CoNG. REc. 5376 (1937).
4656 (1937).
"Alford v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
2140 STAT. 228 (1917), 18 U. S.C.A. §612(2) (1927).
22*Conyer v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935). There is a
distinction here in that "a felony" is used rather than "any felony." One could
2881 CONG. REc.

be interpreted to go as far as the other, however.
23 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4283.
"* WEST VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) §5980.

If the check were for less
than $20.00 under this statute it would be a misdemeanor. In the Fourth Circuit
of the Circuit Court of Appeals, of the five states therein, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Maryland make the offense of writing a bad check a misdemeanor.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4283; CODE OF LAWS OF S. C. (Michie, 1932)
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It is stated in a federal case in Indiana involving the same statute
that Congress did not intend to include the offense of obtaining money
under false pretenses in the statute, for it did not expressly provide
for that offense.2 5 This holding is an example of the same statute
being given a strict interpretation. If the indictment had been as in
the present case the defendant could have been convicted, for the writing
26
of a bad check is a felony under the Indiana law.

A like result was

reached in a Pennsylvania case where the defendant was released because his act of giving a forged check did not constitute either larceny
or a federal felony ;2T but had he merely been indicted for intending to
give a forged check he would have been within the present interpretation of the statute, for forgery is a felony under the Pennsylvania
Code.28 These decisions would tend to show that other judges and
prosecuting officers are not completely in accord with the interpretation
given in the present case, and the possibility of having non-uniform
offenses against the federal government might make it wise either to
rewrite the law, indicating freely the intention of Congress, or to interpret the statute so that it covers only felonies under the federal law.
Certiorari has recently been granted 29 in a case concerning the same
issue involved in the instant decision, and an authoritative ruling may
C. D. HOGUE, JR.
soon be forthcoming.
Marine Insurance-Return of Excess Premiums-Innocent
Overvaluaion-Risk Bearing in Transoceanic Shipments
A pearl necklace, left in Germany upon the death of the owner, was
adjudged by a German "official protocol" to be worth $60,000, and
was sought to be obtained from Germany by the executors of the estate
§1167; ANN. CODE OF MD. (Flack, 1939), Art. 27, §§152 and 150. Virginia and
West Virginia both have distinctions as to when the offense is a felony or a
misdemeanor; Virginia turning the offense into larceny and making distinction
between grand and petit larceny at $5.00t; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936)
§4149(44), grand larceny being a felony, id. §4758. It is thus possible to commit
the same crime within the same circuit and be guilty of an offense against the
United States if it is committed in one part, and not guilty if committed in another part. There would not seem to be any apparent reason why the cashing of
a check in a national bank would impair its efficiency more in one state so as to
make it an offense against the United States than in another where it would be no
offense against the United States.
" United States v. Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596 (N. D. Ind. 1940). Here the
indictment was for larceny by trick, and the court held that the defendant could
not be convicted because there was consent to the taking of the title and the
possession of the money.
-"IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §§10-2105, and 9-101.
2T United States v. Patton, 120 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941) (indictment
was for larceny, but the court held that the bank relinquished title and possession
when it cashed the forged check and thus it could not be larceny).
28 18 PENNA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) §3611.
"Jerome v. United States, 11 U. S. L. WEEK 3106 (U. S. 1942).

